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Based on a model that views men and women as participants in competitive markets for 
women’s home production time, we predict that the scarcer women are relative to men, the less 
married women are likely to participate in the labor force.  The magnitude of this effect is 
expected to depend on married women’s educational attainment.  We use time series for four 
U.S. regions to test our prediction.  As hypothesized, we find that an increase in the growth rate 
of the sex ratio results in a decline in the labor force participation growth rate of married women.  
However, the sex ratio effect is attenuated the greater the growth rate in college-educated wives.     1 
I. Introduction 
 
While married women have traditionally played an important economic role within the 
confines of their homes, marriage bars and other socio-economic factors led U.S. women to 
experience low labor force participation (LFP) rates until World War II.  Women’s LFP rates in 
the U.S. experienced a marked increase between 1965 and 1980, the improvement being most 
remarkable for married women.  For instance, during these fifteen years, the LFP rate of women 
ages 25 to 29 rose from 39 percent to 67 percent, an increase of 28 percentage points.  In 
contrast, in the next fifteen years—from 1980 to 1995—the LFP rate for this age group grew by 
only 8 percentage points to 75 percent of women in the labor force, and it has not grown much 
ever since.  
Economic explanations of labor supply have principally focused on wage and income 
effects.  In this paper, we show that these trends can be explained not only by variables 
traditionally included in models of female labor supply, but also by changing equilibrium 
conditions in markets for married women’s home production time due to fluctuations in birth 
rates and ensuing variations in the ratio of men to women likely to marry each other.  This is 
what demographers refer to as the sex ratio of ‘marriageables’, which helps explain the trend in 
female labor force participation rates in four U.S. regions for the period 1965-2000.  
Our explanation hinges on the assumptions that a majority of men and women adhere to 
traditional roles of wife/homemaker and husband/provider and that markets establish equilibrium 
values for women’s work in marital household production.  Since adherence to traditional gender 
roles varies with educational attainment, we estimate models that allow for interaction between 
sex ratio and education.  We expect variations in sex ratio to explain more of the fluctuations in 
married women’s LFP when the percent of college-educated women is lower.   2   
 
Our analysis expands on analyses of changes in women’s LFP over time by Pencavel 
(1998) and Grossbard-Shechtman and Granger (1998).  Pencavel (1998) found that, in the U.S., 
generational differences in women’s LFP rates account for considerable variation in LFP rates 
over time, whereas variables typically included in economic models of labor supply account for 
relatively little of such LFP variation.  Grossbard-Shechtman and Granger (1998) offered an 
explanation as to why cohorts matter.  They used time series data for the period 1965 to 1990 
and showed that ‘being born in a growing cohort’ explained a large part of the variation in all 
women’s LFP in the U.S., regardless of marital status.   
We add to the study by Grossbard-Shechtman and Granger (1998) in several ways.  First, 
we examine the effect of sex ratios in addition to accounting for any cohort effects.  Second, we 
use a regional time series analysis, whereas their analysis relied on time series for the U.S.  
Third, our time series covers a substantially longer time period.  Fourth, we focus our attention 
on married women on whose labor supply sex ratios are expected to have more impact.  Finally, 
we examine how sex ratio effects on married women’s LFP rates are affected by women’s 
educational attainment.     
II.   Theoretical Perspective 
In the past, economists have given the following reasons why women’s LFP would 
fluctuate over time and across regions. 
1.  Income and Wages 
According to Mincer (1962), higher wages had been a major reason why women were 
attracted to join the labor force prior to 1960.  Mincer solved a puzzle that had confounded labor 
economists at the time: time series results showed that women’s LFP and wages were growing in 
the same direction, in apparent contradiction to findings of a negative association between wages 3   
 
and women’s LFP based on cross-sectional data. Mincer resolved this puzzle by separating the 
effects of male and female wages.  What explained women’s entry into the labor force in time 
series were increases in women’s wages, whereas increases in male wages accounted for the 
negative association between wages and women’s LFP in cross-sections studies.  Mincer 
interpreted the effect of married women’s own wages on their LFP rates as a substitution effect 
and the effect of husbands’ wages primarily as an income effect.  
While this wage/income explanation has held for earlier periods, its effectiveness in 
explaining recent trends in LFP seems limited.  A number of studies have indicated that, in 
recent years, women’s wages and their LFP have not been moving in the same direction.  Rosen 
(1992) pointed out that the LFP rates of women increased greatly during the 1970’s, when 
women’s wages were stagnant or declining.  It is possible that a low positive association between 
female wages and female labor supply reflects the fact that women entering the labor market for 
the first time had low levels of human capital.  
Leibowitz and Klerman (1995) based on cross-sections from various years of the Current 
Population Survey found that, relative to women’s wages, men’s wages and unemployment 
explained more changes in married mothers’ employment between 1971 and 1990.  A possible 
explanation for the stronger effect exhibited by male wages on women’s LFP relative to female 
wages is that female wages are endogenous in a study of female LFP.  For any given demand for 
female labor, changes in the supply of that labor will cause fluctuations in wages.   
2.  Education  
  Previous studies have found that the rise in women’s LFP was associated with increased 4   
 
levels of education.
1  This is consistent with the view that education improves the individual’s 
preparation for the job market, raising her permanent wages and the opportunity cost of leisure 
and home production, all of which favors an increased participation in the labor market.  
Additionally, education affects the supply and demand for women’s work in household 
production through the marriage market, as we discuss below. 
3.  Culture 
Partially as a result of the decreasing explanatory power of wage/income variables,
2 
scholars –especially those trained in sociology– have turned to cultural explanations focused on 
variables such as attitudes towards work and family.  To account for possible changes in attitude 
affecting married women’s LFP rates, we include a set of year dummies in the analysis, even 
though we recognize that these dummies may also capture other factors, such as the state of the 
economy (boom or bust).   
4.  Fertility 
  The growth in women’s LFP rates over time has also been attributed in part to decreases 
in fertility.
3  Causality here can go either way.  Not only is it possible that lower fertility 
explained increases in women’s labor supply, but higher LFP rates may have also caused lower 
fertility.  Furthermore, labor supply and fertility may also be related spuriously due to the effect 
of other variables on both labor supply and fertility (e.g. Deville (1977) and Lehrer and Nerlove 
(1986)).  Acknowledging the importance of women’s childbearing on their LFP choices, and 
despite the difficulties of appropriately isolating its true impact, we control for women’s fertility 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Huet (1977), Shapiro and Shaw (1983), Smith and Ward (1984), Mincer 
(1985), Goldin (1990), and Leibowitz and Klerman (1995). 
2 In this regard, Pencavel (1998) posits that variation in male and female wages accounts for less 
than half of the observed changes in women’s LFP rates over time. 
3 See, for example, Mincer (1962), Deville (1977), Ekert (1983), Smith and Ward (1984), Mincer 
(1985), Goldin (1990), Rosen (1992), and Leibowitz and Klerman (1995). 5   
 
as captured by the percent of women with children less than six years of age living in the 
household.  To the extent that women who report having a child under the age of six living in the 
household made their childbearing decisions prior to the interview date during which they report 
their current work status, this variable is predetermined to their current labor supply choices if 
not exogenous.    
5.  Sex Ratios 
To explain why sex ratios matter, we first review some economic analyses of marriage 
markets.  Following Grossbard (1976), we view marriage as a small non-profit firm that governs 
the exchange of work in household production in return for monetary and non-monetary 
compensation.
4  Following Grossbard-Shechtman (1984), we assume that workers in marital 
household production maximize their utility and decide on their allocation of time to leisure, 
home production time, and labor force participation.
5,6  As in conventional models of labor 
demand and supply (D & S) , there is a supply and a demand for work in marital household 
production.  We assume that the market for work in household production is competitive and that 
the market equilibrium dictates compensation levels for workers in household production similar 
to wages in the labor market.
7  These compensations can take a material form –such as the 
                                                 
4 Both men and women could be working in household production, but since we are focusing on 
explaining women’s LFP, we are focusing on women as workers in marital household 
production, and on men as offering them compensating benefits of monetary or non-monetary 
nature.    
5 In contrast, most other theories of marriage implicitly assume that all of a person’s time 
belongs to their marriage.  This holds for Becker (1973, 1981), Chiappori (1988), Lundberg and 
Pollak (1993).   
6 Grossbard-Shechtman (1984) assumes that individuals only have private utility and there are no 
public goods. Grossbard (2005) expands this model to a situation where individuals maximize 
their utility from household public goods. 
7 Note that market models are related to search models.  In fact, search models can be viewed as 
a subcategory of market models dealing with the dynamic process of how a person gets a job 
offer and possibly accepts it. 6   
 
benefit of health care, lodging, and other living expenses– or they may consist of psychic 
benefits.  Our focus in this study is on married women as workers in marital household 
production.  We assume that a majority of married women who do not participate in the labor 
force work in marital production benefiting their husbands.  These couples may follow 
traditional gender lines and husbands may compensate their wives for their household production 
by contributing to a greater extent in paying any household bills. 
It follows from a D & S analysis of markets for women’s work in marital household 
production that the higher men’s demand relative to the supply, the higher the equilibrium 
compensation women can expect for their work in marital household production.  One reason 
why demand may be high relative to supply is that there may be more men demanding women’s 
work in household production than there are women supplying these services.  Therefore, ceteris 
paribus, the higher the sex ratio (defined as the number of male participants divided by the 
number of female participants) in a market for dating and marriage composed of individual men 
and women with traditional preferences for gender roles, the higher the market compensation 
that women can expect to receive for work in marital household production.  In contrast, women 
participating in marriage markets with low sex ratios experience a lower demand for work in 
marital household production and, thus, are expected to earn a lower compensation for that work. 
We capture the essence of this familiar competitive D & S model with the following 
equation:  
(1)  y =y (Z), 
where y is the market-established compensation married women can expect to receive for their 
work in household production and Z is a vector of factors affecting that compensation via shifts 7   
 
in demand or supply.  One of these factors is the sex ratio in the marriage market to which a 
woman belongs.   
We are particularly interested in that part of the compensation for women’s work in 
marital household production that takes the form of access to the husband’s income.  Following 
Grossbard-Shechtman and Neuman (1988), equation (1) can be restated as: 
(2)  y= k(Z)*I,       
where I is husband’s income, and k is the proportion of that income that the married woman has 
access to, reflecting the husband’s willingness to pay the bills.  Factors shifting demand and 
supply in the market for women’s work in marital household production, such as the sex ratio or 
income, can affect k.
8  The decision to participate in the labor force is then modeled as a function 
of the wage w in regular labor markets relative to the compensation y for marital household 
production.  It follows from the first order conditions of a standard occupational choice model 
that: 
(3)  1>0   if  (w + Mul /Mux) > (y + Mum/Mux),       
where l stands for work in the labor force and, therefore, 1>0  means positive LFP; m is work in 
marital household production; x are market goods and services; and Mu stands for marginal 
utility.  This condition states that a woman will work in the labor market if the total 
compensation from the labor market (pecuniary and psychic) exceeds the total compensation 
(material and non-material) from marital household production.  Hence, ceteris paribus, the 
higher the compensation for women’s work in household production (y), the less a woman is 
                                                 
8 It is assumed that the material benefits and the psychic benefits included in y don’t behave in 
opposite directions, and that even if they do (the possible result of compensating differentials, 
see Grossbard-Shechtman 1984), it remains the case that the factors in Z that lead to a higher 
total compensation will also lead to a higher material benefit paid by the husband: k(Z)*I. 8   
 
likely to enter the labor force.
9  This holds regardless of whether the sex ratio varies due to 
regional or time fluctuations.   
Sex ratios vary over time because of fluctuations in cohort size.  Cohort size variations 
can cause fluctuations in sex ratio because, on average, the men dating or marrying a particular 
group of women tend to be older than they are.  For instance, if a particular cohort is larger than 
a preceding cohort, the sex ratio calculated for that particular group of women will be less than 
one.
10  Such is the case of cohorts of women born at the beginning of a baby boom and likely to 
marry men born prior to that baby boom and, thus, belonging to smaller cohorts.  Vice-versa, if a 
particular cohort of women is smaller than a preceding cohort, the sex ratio will be larger than 
one.  For example, cohorts of women born at the beginning of a baby bust will typically marry 
men born prior to that baby bust who belong to larger cohorts.   
It follows that baby-boom women (i.e. women born during the baby boom) would be 
more likely to participate in the labor force than baby-busters (Heer and Grossbard-Shechtman 
1981, Grossbard-Shechtman and Granger 1998).  In the U.S., there was rapid growth in the LFP 
of married women ages 25 to 29 in the years 1965-1980.  These are precisely the years during 
which baby-boomers were reaching these ages.  In contrast, married women entering ages 25 to 
29 in the period 1980-95 were born during the baby-bust.  As such, we expect that, relatively to 
their baby-boom counterparts, they would obtain a higher y if they are willing to work in marital 
production.  This implies smaller increases in LFP for baby-bust women born in 1964 and 
reaching the age of 25 in 1989 relative to baby-boom women born in 1946 and reaching the age 
                                                 
9 Higher sex ratios are expected to be associated not only with higher compensations for 
women’s work in household production but also with higher marriage rates and lower 
cohabitation rates (see Heer and Grossbard-Shechtman 1981, Guttentag and Secord 1983, and 
Angrist 2002).  
10 Note that the more rigid age preferences, the more fluctuations in cohort size will cause 
marriage market imbalances. 9   
 
of 25 in 1971.  
Sex ratios can also vary across geographic areas.  In the past, cross-city comparisons have 
also provided evidence of a negative association between sex ratios and married women’s labor 
supply.  It was found that married women were more likely to supply labor in cities where sex 
ratios are higher than average (Grossbard-Shechtman and Neideffer 1997, Chiappori, Fortin and 
Lacroix 2002).  Furthermore, good labor demand conditions for women simultaneously attract 
female migrants (thus lowering sex ratios) and lead women to participate more in the labor force, 
providing an alternative explanation for a negative association between regional sex ratios and 
women’s LFP. 
An alternative explanation for an inverse relationship between LFP of women and 
fluctuations in cohort size can be found in Easterlin’s (1980) theory.  According to Easterlin, 
growing cohorts, such as baby-boomers, face worse income opportunities than the ones 
encountered by their parents when they were growing up.  Baby-boom women thus may meet  
baby-boom men with low relative incomes.  This would also push married women into the labor 
force. Furthermore, according to Easterlin, baby-boom couples are also expected to have fewer 
children.  This could lead to the prediction that married baby-boom women have higher LFP 
rates.   However, if sex ratio effects on married women’s LFP persist after appropriately 
accounting for income and fertility, a D & S analysis of marriage would provide a better 
explanation for the observed female labor supply trends.  
6.  Intervening Effect of Education   
So far the analysis herein has assumed that traditional women are willing to work in 
marital household production and traditional men are interested in marrying women who work in 
marital household production.  Adherence to traditional gender roles is expected to be an 10   
 
important determinant of whether fluctuations in sex ratio affect married women’s LFP or not.  
The less people follow such traditional roles, possibly because the division of labor in the 
household is more egalitarian, the less it is likely that men pay women for working in household 
production.  Additionally, the more egalitarian the gender roles, the more work in marital 
household production is replaced by contracts to outsiders –such as restaurants and child care 
workers, eliminating the need for any marital compensation for household production.  
Education is a good predictor of traditionalism in a couple’s division of labor. Egalitarian 
gender roles are more commonly found among the college educated (see Hersch 2003).  
Educated women would thus be less likely to be monetarily compensated for work in marital 
production and thus less likely to avoid entering the labor force.  This explanation for educated 
women’s higher rates of labor force participation can be added to two more commonly given 
explanations: educated women’s higher wage (w) and marginal utility derived from working 
(Mul).
11  Therefore, the greater the percent of college-educated wives, the smaller the reduction 
in married women’s LFP following an increase in the sex ratio.  
In the next section, we examine the LFP effects of sex ratios over time (cohort size 
effects) and across regions while accounting for the aforementioned factors possibly influencing 
female LFP decisions.     
III.  Data and Empirical Methodology 
 Data 
  With the exception of the data on sex ratios, the data used in this study were extracted 
from Current Population Surveys (CPS, March files) and aggregated by five-year age groups in 
four regions (Northeast, Midwest, South and West) for every five years between 1965 and the 
                                                 
11 More educated individuals may be able to find higher quality jobs, enabling them to enjoy 
their jobs more than their less educated counterparts.   11   
 
year 2000.  Data for married women (LFP, fertility, and percent with college education) were 
obtained for age groups 20 to 24, 25 to 29, 30 to 34, 35 to 39, and 40 to 44.  We do not consider 
women older than 44 given our interest in women who may get compensated for their women’s 
work in household production, with women with young children at home having a higher 
likelihood of receiving intra-marriage transfers of income.  Data on men’s wages were extracted 
for men who are two years older, i.e. 22 to 26, etc. up to age 46.  We then calculated frequencies 
for each of the year/age/region groups.  
  Reliable CPS data were first collected in 1967, and our 1965 data are extrapolated from 
the data for 1967 and 1970.  Inconsistencies in how variables were defined at different points in 
time were resolved using the UNICON version of the CPS data.  Nonetheless, we still 
encountered difficulties in constructing a fertility variable.  For some years, we have information 
on the presence of children under age three in the household, while for other years there is only 
information on the presence of children under age six.  Hence, we chose to use the percent of 
married women who have a child under age six in a particular time/age/region group as our 
fertility variable.  We recreated the frequencies of married women with children under age six 
living in the household for the years 1970 and 1975 for which this information is missing.  In 
particular, for the year 1975, we extrapolated the frequency of married women with children 
under age six living in the household from the frequencies that we obtained for the years 1976 to 
1980, assuming that the yearly growth (decline) rate was constant over the period 1975 to 1980.  
To create the value of this variable for 1970, we used information on the percent growth of 
married women with children under the age of three living in the household between 1970 and 
1975, along with the frequency of married women with children under the age of six computed 
for 1975.  Therefore, we had to assume that the growth (decline) rate over the period 1970 to 12   
 
1975 was the same for the frequency of married women with children under age three and with 
children less than six years of age (see Data Appendix for greater detail).  
Sex ratios were calculated from Census data for five-year age groups by dividing the 
number of men two years older by the number of women in a particular cohort, i.e. we computed  
(4)  Sex Ratio = (Mt-2 + Mt-1 + Mt + Mt+1 + Mt+2) / (Ft + Ft+1 + Ft+2 + Ft+3 + Ft+4),  
where M is the number of men and F the number of women.
12  We used a fixed male/female age 
difference at marriage of two years, the average age difference at first marriage in the U.S.
13  It 
was assumed that the marriage market conditions influencing LFP at any given age are captured 
by the sex ratios that people face when they are in their twenties, when they are most likely to 
enter a first marriage.  Depending on the age/year group, sex ratios were derived using data from 
the Census for women 20-24 or 25-29 and for men 22-26 or 27-31.  These age groups are chosen 
under the assumption that marriage conditions when people are in their twenties are likely to 
continue to influence their marital compensation later on in life.  What moves these sex ratios is 
the difference between the number of the women born in years (t+3) and (t+4) and the number 
of men born in years (t–1) and (t–2).
14   
  Values for the sex ratio for women born between 1926 and 1980 and men born between 
1924 and 1978 in the four regions of the U.S. as well as for the entire country are shown in Table 
1.  Each five-year cohort was given a name related to historical events that occurred around their 
year of birth.  Focusing on the U.S. as a whole (bold numbers), it can be seen that this sex ratio 
fluctuated dramatically from a minimum of 0.87 for the women born right after World War II in 
                                                 
12 The difference in age at marriage was surprisingly stable during the whole period under study. 
13 Varying age differences were assumed in the calculation of sex ratios by Goldman et al. 
(1984). 
14 The numbers of men and women born in years t, (t+1), and (t+2) are roughly equal and appear 
in both the numerator and the denominator of these sex ratios. 13   
 
the years 1946-50 (men born 1944-48), to a maximum of 1.07 for the women born in 1971-75 
(men born 1969-1973) around the passage of Roe versus Wade, a landmark ruling that led the 
number of abortions to increase in the United States.
 15  The sex ratio for women born in 1966-70 
(men born 1964-68), the Moon generation, was also high at 1.06. 
Table 1 also reports changes in LFP rates for married women of different ages.  These are 
changes over the last five years.  Table 1 indicates a negative correlation between sex ratio and 
married women’s LFP.  It can be seen that almost at every age the Post-World War II generation 
women, the women with the lowest sex ratio, experienced faster growth in LFP than other five-
year cohorts of women.  For example, it is shown in Table 1 that married women age 30-34  
experienced an increase of 13.5 percentage points in LFP when the women of the Post-World 
War II generation (born 1946-50) replaced the women of WWII ( born 1941-1945) in 1980.  The 
latter’s LFP at that age in 1975 stood at 45.8 percent.  Within five years, as this age group filled 
with the birth cohort of 1946-1950, the LFP rate for this group jumped to 59.3 percent in the 
labor force, an increase of 13.5 percentage points. This generation had the lowest sex ratio of any 
five-year generation born in the twentieth century: .87 (WW II women also had a low sex ratio, 
but it was not as low).  Furthermore, it can be seen that married women born in periods of baby 
bust have experienced either no growth in LFP, or a slight decrease relative to the previous 
generation (in the case of Moon generation women age 30 to 34 in 2000).  Table 1 also shows 
that regional variations in sex ratio are negatively correlated with changes in married women’s 
LFP, as we predicted. 
Our model of LFP is estimated using six years of data from the period 1975 to 2000 (at 
five-year intervals), resulting in 120 aggregate observations (6 points in time, 4 regions, and 5 
                                                 
15 Links between abortion law changes and changes in fertility in the 1970s have been discussed, 
e.g. by Donohue and Levitt (1999) and Angrist and Evans (1999). 14   
 
age groups).  Table 2 presents means, standard deviations, and definitions for the variables used 
in our analysis.  
 Empirical  Methodology 
   As it is common in the labor literature,
16 we specify a basic model of the LFP rate in the 
logarithms of our continuous dependent variables, as follows:
17 
(5)   e + Y c + R c + A c + SR   c E     c + F     c +  w   c + c = LFP tir t r i tir tir tir
m
tir 1 0 tir 7 6 5 4 3 2 log log log log +   
where LFP represents married women’s LFP rates, 
m w are average real wages of married men, F 
stands for women’s fertility as captured by the percent of women with children under six years of 
age living in the household, E represents the percent of married women with a college education, 
SR is the sex ratio, A stands for age group dummies, R represents the region dummies, and Y is a 
vector of year dummies.  Each variable is defined for time t, age group i, and region r.   
  Women’s fertility and educational attainment may be endogenous to their LFP.  
However, while endogenous, both of these variables can be considered to be predetermined to 
the extent that women who report having a child under the age of six living in the household 
made their childbearing decisions prior to the interview during which they report about their 
current work status.  Similarly, the educational attainment question refers to whether or not the 
wife has a college diploma, which involves a decision regarding her educational attainment made 
well before the interview.   
                                                 
16 See Hamermesh (1995) for examples using this type of specification as well as Grossbard-
Shechtman and Granger (1998). 
17 The estimation of our model in levels yields very small coefficient estimates with no 
significant alterations of the final results.    15   
 
  Equation 5 is differentiated with respect to time in order to reduce the effect of some of 
the unmeasured factors that influence residual correlations.  Thus, we first estimate the following 
model: 




























3 2 1 0 5 τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ + + =
∂
∂   
 
where w / w   ff  indicates a rate of growth.  We approximate the dependent variable in equation 
(6) by the change in women’s rate of LFP over a five-year period (denoted by DLFP).  Hence, as 
is commonly done in time series analysis, we estimate changes in LFP as a function of rates of 
growth in our continuous explanatory variables.  In addition, we test for any serial correlation in 
the error terms using the Durbin-Watson statistic.  
The theoretical model predicts that the coefficients on the sex ratio, male wages, and 
married women’s fertility in equation (6) will be negative.  In contrast, the estimated coefficient 
on the growth rate of the percent of college-educated married women is expected to have a 
positive sign.  In order to assess whether sex ratios have a differential effect on married women’s 
LFP rates depending on their educational attainment, we interact SR and E. We expect that the 
coefficient of the interaction term will be negative.  Hence, our second model specification is 
given by: 
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  Finally, we re-estimate equation (7) adding a square term for the rate of growth in the sex 
ratio to test for non-linearities in sex ratio effects.  This square term is also interacted with 
education, resulting in our third model specification: 16   
 
(8)  
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IV.   Sex Ratio Effects on Married Women’s Labor Force Participation    
The results from estimating equations (6) to (8) are reported as models 1, 2 and 3 in 
Table 3.  In all models, the Durbin Watson statistic is close to 2, failing to reject the null 
hypothesis of non-serially correlated errors.  In accordance with the earlier literature on labor 
supply, we find a negative association between the changes in married women’s LFP and the rate 
of growth in married men’s average real wages.  Also in line with previous findings in the 
literature, we observe a direct relationship between changes in married women’s LFP and the 
growth rate in the percent of college-educated married women.   
We are principally interested in examining the association between sex ratios and 
married women’s LFP.  All models show that the sex ratio has a negative effect on married 
women’s LFP.  However, models 2 and 3 show that its statistical significance is dependent on 
married women’s educational attainment.  As predicted, we find a positive sign for the 
interaction between the rate of growth in the sex ratio and the rate of growth in the percent of 
college-educated married women.  Since model 3 indicates that the effect of sex ratio does not 
take the form of a quadratic expression, we rely on model 2 to calculate the sex ratio effect under 
different assumptions regarding the rate of growth in the percent of college-educated married 
women.
18   
                                                 
18 This is done as follows: SR effect = {coefficient on SR + [coefficient on (E*SR)]*mean value 
of E}. In this case a 1 percent increase in the growth rate of the sex ratio would lead to the 
following change in married women’s LFP rate: [-0.1153+[0.0051*20.25)] = -0.012 17   
 
As shown by Table 2, the average rate of growth in the percent of college-educated 
married women over a five-year period was 20 percent for all 120 age/region/year categories.  
The standard deviation was 26.65 percent.  Using this information, we calculate the sex ratio 
effect at 10 percent below the mean and at 10 percent above the mean value for the rate of 
growth in the percent of college-educated married women.  Were the rate of growth in the 
percent of college-educated married women at 10 percent below the mean, meaning that the 
percent of college-educated married women grew at 10.25 percent over five years rather than at 
20.25 percent, an increase in the rate of growth of the sex ratio by 1 percent would be associated 
with a drop of 6.4 percentage points in married women’s LFP over a five year period.  Were the 
rate of growth in the percent of college-educated wives at 10 percent above the mean,
19 a 1 
percent increase in the growth rate of the sex ratio would lead to an increase, instead of a 
decrease, of 4 percentage points in the LFP over a five year period.  
Furthermore, we find an inverse link between the change in married women’s LFP rates 
and the fraction of women in the 20-24 age group.  This could simply be a result of the 
increasing percent of women in this age group still in school relative to the increasing growth 
rate in the percent of older women (reference category) in the labor force.  We also observe a 
negative coefficient for the Western region of the U.S. relative to the Midwest, which could be 
the reflection of various factors.  Among them, the possibility exists that this region’s fewer 
changes in the percent of married women in the labor force is, in part, explained by its already 
higher LFP of married women at the beginning of the time period being examined.  Finally, there 
seems to be a declining trend in the change of married women’s LFP from 1990 onwards relative 
to our base year: 1975.   
                                                 
19 Note that the percent of college-educated married women grew at 30.25 percent over five 
years. 18   
 
V.   Discussion and Conclusions 
After controlling for changes in men’s wages, married women’s fertility, educational 
attainment, age, and year and region fixed-effects, we find evidence of a statistically significant 
negative association between sex ratios and the LFP of married women of limited educational 
attainment.  This result is based on a dataset that exploits regional and time fluctuations.  Our 
time series results thus help explain why young generations of married women characterized by 
high sex ratios have experienced stagnation and perhaps decreases in LFP (see Table 1), while 
older generations of married women characterized by low sex ratios have experienced rapid 
increases in LFP.   
In recent years, sex ratios have been rising as baby-bust generations have entered markets 
for dating and marriage.  If we have not witnessed drops in the LFP of married women 
paralleling the increases in LFP witnessed for baby-boom women in earlier decades, it could be 
because sex ratios increased along with women’s educational attainment, with these two 
variables having opposite effects on women’s LFP rates.   
Alternative interpretations of our time series results can be derived from Easterlin’s 
theory: he predicted a positive association between cohort size and the participation of married 
women in the LF.  Since changes in cohort size are inversely related to sex ratio variation over 
time, Easterlin’s theory also led to the prediction of an inverse relation between sex ratios and 
married women’s LF.  However, Easterlin’s explanation for the link between the sex ratio and 
the labor supply of women can be separated from the argument made here by controlling for both 
income and fertility, as we do in our analysis.  Furthermore, our findings reveal the existence of a 
sex ratio effect when women have relatively low education, a result that does not follow from 
Easterlin’s theory.  19   
 
To the extent that our findings are partially the result of regional variation, an alternative 
explanation for the negative association between sex ratios and married women’s LFP is that 
regions offering better job opportunities to women attract more women and, therefore, have 
lower sex ratios.  However, it is not clear why this effect would weaken with a higher percent of 
college-educated women.  On the contrary, one expects more migration by highly educated 
women than by women with low education and, consequently, according to this alternative 
migration hypothesis, the negative association between sex ratio should be stronger in the case of 
more educated women. 
Overall, it seems reasonable to conclude that causality runs in the direction that we 
posited and that we see some evidence of sex ratio effects on married women’s LFP.  The 
finding that an increase in the growth rate of the sex ratio results in a decline in the growth rate 
of wives’ LFP makes sense in terms of our model:  assuming traditional gender roles and 
competitive markets for women’s work in marital household production, marriage market 
conditions that favor women (i.e., higher sex ratios) lead men to be more likely to pay the bills in 
marriage, inducing more women to drop out of the labor force.  Furthermore, this model applies 
better the lower the percent of college-educated women, since men and women with low 
education are less likely to adopt egalitarian gender roles.  
Future work should examine whether sex ratios affect other dimensions of labor supply, 
such as the labor supply of men, and the attachment of men and women to the labor force.  
Additionally, it would be of interest to draw international comparisons.  In sum, it is hoped that 
this study will increase researchers’ interest in D & S analysis of markets for marital household 
production, which have proven potentially useful for explaining a wide range of household 
behavior.  20   
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1926-1930 Pre-Depression  U.S.  0.98  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 4.96 
    NE  0.95  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.68 
    Midwest  1.06  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  10.05 
    South  0.96  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.07 
    West  0.99  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.31 
1931-1935 Depression  U.S. 1.00  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  6.69  5.65 
   NE  0.96  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  4.80  3.87 
   Midwest  1.06  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  8.87  5.63 
   South  1.01  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  7.56  6.94 
   West  1.01  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  3.87  5.05 
1936-1940 New  Deal  U.S.  0.95 n.a.  n.a.  6.84  5.09  9.23 
   NE  0.95  n.a.  n.a.  6.02  2.18  12.61 
   Midwest  1.02  n.a.  n.a.  5.85  6.03  9.75 
   South  0.92  n.a.  n.a.  8.89  3.12  6.25 
   West  0.91  n.a.  n.a.  6.22  9.75  10.35 
1941-1945  World War II  U.S.  0.91 n.a.  5.97  5.44  10.83  4.12 
   NE  0.90  n.a.  7.23  5.25  12.88  1.77 
   Midwest  0.93  n.a.  6.69  6.28  12.33  3.96 
    South  0.88  n.a. 1.74 3.34 9.34 4.52 
    West  0.92  n.a. 9.86 7.17 9.47 5.68 
1946-1950 Post  WW  II  U.S.  0.87 11.28  11.84  13.51  6.61  7.05 
   NE  0.89  10.07  11.05  15.26 8.61 11.11 
   Midwest  0.93  8.43  14.19  17.32  6.53  5.71 
   South  0.84  12.21  10.98  10.32  6.39  7.48 
    West  0.85  14.98 9.71 11.61 5.36  3.92 
1951-1955 Korean  War  U.S.  0.95  10.47  8.25 6.06 5.28 2.85 
   NE  0.94  12.22  13.59  8.18  6.52  -0.11 
    Midwest  0.99  14.28  8.80 5.55 4.82 6.84 
    South  0.93  9.22 6.70 6.45 3.86 0.13 
    West  0.94  5.12 6.18 4.28 6.30 5.81 
1956-1960 Sputnik  U.S.  0.97  2.12 7.40 3.82 1.40 1.23 
    NE  0.97  2.68 5.44 2.46 0.86 2.98 
    Midwest  1.04  2.08 6.00 4.23 2.83 0.27 
    South  0.93  1.19 7.26 5.59 2.47 3.29 
   West  0.96  5.19  9.84  2.81  -0.78  -2.22 24   
 




















1961-1965 Kennedy  U.S.  1.03 4.60  3.49  3.62  -1.84  n.a. 
   NE  1.01  6.65  2.54  4.54  -0.77  n.a. 
   Midwest  1.09  10.02  6.18  5.03  -2.67  n.a. 
   South  1.01  1.79  6.90  2.98  -0.58  n.a. 
    West  1.01  1.55 -2.31 2.19 -2.97 n.a. 
1966-1970 Moon  U.S.  1.06 -0.23  -0.14  -2.14  n.a.  n.a. 
   NE  1.05  -3.66 2.59 -0.80 n.a.  n.a. 
    Midwest  1.16  -1.66 4.28 -2.00 n.a.  n.a. 
   South  1.03  1.65  -5.06  -1.22  n.a.  n.a. 
   West  1.02  1.49  -0.38  -4.45  n.a.  n.a. 
1971-1975 Roe  U.S.  1.07 -0.23  0.76  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
   NE  1.05  -0.06  1.62  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
   Midwest  1.11  1.43  -0.11  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
   South  1.06  1.63  4.06  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
   West  1.06  -2.27  -1.24  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
1976-1980 First  Echo  U.S.  1.01  0.15 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
    NE  1.01  -0.61  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
    Midwest  1.08  -1.95  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
    South  0.97  -1.50  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
    West  0.98  -1.47  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Notes:  
1Ratio of men age 22 to 26 to women age 20 to 24 or men age 27 to 31 to women age 25 to 29 calculated based on Census data from 1940 to 2000.  
The age group depends on the Census year.  Sex ratios for last two generations were calculated based on the 1990 Census using younger age groups.  
2Calculated from CPS years 1965-2000.   25 
Table 2 
Definition and Means (S.D. in Parentheses) for Five-year Age Groups and Five-year Changes, 1970-2000 
 
Variables  Definitions  All Cohorts  
DLFP
  Change in rate of married women’s labor force participation (LFP) over 5-year period  4.58 (4.63) 
Male Wage  Rate of growth in real wages of married men  0.03 (7.76) 
Children6  Rate of growth in the percent of married women with children under 6  -0.21 (14.05) 
College  Rate of growth in the percent of married women with a college degree by age  20.25 (26.65) 
Sex Ratio
1  Rate of growth in the ratio of number of men two years older over number of women   0.02 (0.06) 
Sources:  March CPS 1965-2000.  
1U.S. Bureau of the Census.  See the notes at the bottom of Table 1.     
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Table 3 
Regression of Changes in Married Women’s Labor Force Participation in the U.S. during 1965-2000  
 























































































































































Number of observations  120  120  120 
F-statistic 14.46  14.67  13.45 
Prob > F  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
R-squared 0.6546  0.6687  0.6737 
Durbin-Watson d-statistic  1.9750  2.0037  1.9746 
Notes: standard deviations in parentheses; * significant at p > .10; ** significant at p > .05; *** significant 
at p >.01.  All regressions include a constant term.  Age 40-44, Midwest, and Year 1975 are used as 
reference categories.   27
Data Appendix 
 
Reliable CPS data were first collected in 1967, and our 1965 data are extrapolated from 
the data for 1967 and 1970.  To recreate the frequencies of married women with children under 
age six living in the household for the year 1975, we extrapolated the frequency of married 
women with children under age six living in the household from the frequencies we obtained for 
the years 1976 to 1980, assuming the yearly growth (decline) rate was constant over the period 
1975 to 1980. 
  To create the value of this variable for 1970, we used information on the percent growth 
of married women with children under the age of three living in the household between 1970 and 
1975, along with the frequency of married women with children under the age of six computed 
for 1975.  Here, we assumed that the growth (decline) rate over the period 1970 to 1975 was the 
same for the frequency of married women with children under age three and with children under 
six years of age as follows:  
(Freq_children6)1970=(Freq_children6)1975*[1-(Percent change of Freq_children3)1975/100] 
where Freq_children6 stands for the frequency of married women with children under six years 
of age in the household and Freq_children3 represents the frequency of married women with 
children under three years of age in the household. 
 